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THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF STATE AID: SOME OPEN QUESTIONS 
 





The last few years have seen both a significant shift in EU state aid policy towards a more 
sophisticated economic approach and a great enrichment of the economic literature on state 
aid. This paper examines the control of state aid in the EU in the light of the new literature. It 
begins with a discussion of the objectives of state aid control, taking account of the principle 
of subsidiarity. We discuss whether state aid control should concentrate on limiting the effects 
of aid on trade and competition (i.e. harm to rivals) or whether the purpose is broader and 
includes also considerations such as avoiding government failures and encouraging Member 
States to use state aid more sparingly and target it more efficiently. This leads to a brief 
analysis of how the appropriate welfare standard to be applied in state aid control would vary 
according to the weight given to different objectives. The paper then considers the objectives 
pursued by governments in granting aid with particular emphasis on the concept of market 
failure. The nature and magnitude of the market failure addressed by a state aid, together with 
the design of the aid, will strongly influence the extent of any anti-competitive effects. The 
last two parts (4 and 5) of the paper are devoted to specific problems of assessing anti-
competitive effects using the types of information normally available to the aid-granting 
authorities and the European Commission. Part 4 discusses the problem of assessing the 
effects on competition of aid schemes and broad classes of aid, when the beneficiaries and 
even the affected markets are not known. Because Member States grant a vast number of 
individual aids every year, the Commission has to apply simple criteria to screen out those 
aids that are unlikely to have significant anti-competitive effects. We survey a range of 
indicators that can be used for this purpose and conclude that they all have drawbacks. Part 5 
deals with the problems of assessing individual awards of aid which have failed the screening 
test, discussing how the main characteristics of firms (e.g. market share, vertical integration) 
and markets (such as product differentiation and market growth) may influence a state aid's 
impact on competition. 
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THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF STATE AID: SOME OPEN QUESTIONS 
1.   Introduction 
The control of State aids is an almost unique feature of competition policy in the European 
Union. Only in the EFTA is there a similar system of supranational control over the subsidies 
granted by States to enterprises, a system which owes its existence to the need to harmonise 
competition policies in the European Economic Area. Other regional economic groupings and 
even federal States lack mechanisms for controlling the subsidies granted by their constituent 
parts. For example, in the United States the federal government has no mechanism for 
controlling or even coordinating the aids granted by the States, even though such aids are 
covered by the WTO subsidies code. The benefits of State aid control are clear. In many 
circumstances, subsidies can reduce economic welfare by weakening the incentives for firms 
to improve their efficiency and by enabling the less efficient to survive or even expand at the 
expense of the more efficient. The resulting distortions of trade can lead to friction between 
national governments and to retaliatory measures which may be a source of further 
inefficiency. Furthermore, unless some supranational discipline is imposed, competition 
between governments to attract investment can lead to costly subsidies races. The EU’s 
system of control, based on an agreed set of fundamental principles firmly anchored in the 
Treaties therefore makes an important contribution towards ensuring that the benefits of 
economic integration can be realised
1. 
Article 87 EC establishes the general rule that state aid is forbidden if (a) it is granted 
selectively to "certain undertakings or the production of certain goods", (b) it distorts 
competition or threatens to do so and (c) it affects trade between Member States. However, 
some aids of a social character and aid to make good damage caused by natural disasters are 
exempted from this prohibition. In addition, the Commission has the power to grant 
derogations in respect of aid for the following purposes: 
a) to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally 
low or where there is serious underemployment; 
b) to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to 
remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
c) to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, 
"where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the 
common interest"; 
d) to promote culture and heritage conservation "where such aid does not affect trading 
conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common 
interest." 
Over the past half-century, a large body of secondary legislation and guidelines has grown up 
in order to give practical application to these basic principles. The rules must evolve to keep 
pace with economic and technological change, with the emergence of new political priorities, 
such as the increased emphasis placed on the protection of the environment over the last 
decade, and with new developments in economic theory. Consequently, Community State aid 
policy has undergone a number of important changes in recent years and further reforms are 
envisaged. 
                                                 
1 For a general overview of the rationale for state aid control, see Lehner and Meiklejohn (1991), Chapter 3.   3
In 2005 the Commission published its State Aid Action Plan
2 (SAAP). In this consultation 
document the Commission foresees a thorough modernisation of the EU state aid rules on the 
basis of four groups of objectives: 
1) less and better targeted state aid, 
2) a refined economic approach, 
3) more effective procedures and enforcement, greater predictability and transparency, 
4) sharing of responsibility between the Commission and the Member States. 
The main focus of the present paper is on the second objective. In relation to this objective, 
the SAAP explains that: 
"Making more use of a refined economic approach is a means to ensure a proper and more 
transparent evaluation of the distortions to competition and trade associated with state aid 
measures. This approach can also help investigate the reasons why the market by itself does 
not deliver the desired objectives of common interest and in consequence evaluate the benefits 
of state aid measures in reaching these objectives." 
The Action Plan outlines an assessment procedure based on balancing the positive impact of a 
state aid against its potential negative side-effects. The procedure consists of three steps for 
evaluating the positive effects of a state aid, three for assessing the negative, anti-competitive 
effects. In the first three steps, the Commission asks (i) whether an objective of common 
interest has been accurately identified, (ii) whether state aid is an appropriate instrument for 
achieving the objective and (iii) whether the aid creates the necessary incentives and is 
proportionate. Implicitly, it is assumed that objectives of common interest are normally 
related to remedying market failures, although equity considerations and merit goods may 
also be taken into account. To assess the anti-competitive effects, the Commission considers 
(i) the procedure followed by the Member State to select beneficiaries, (ii) the characteristics 
of the market and the beneficiary and (iii) the amount and type of aid.  The Action Plan does 
not specify how – i.e. according to what welfare function - the positive and negative effects 
will be balanced. This is perhaps understandable, since both types of effects are very difficult 
to quantify ex ante. 
To date, the fullest operational expression of the "refined economic approach" is to be found 
in the Commission's Community framework for state aid for R&D and innovation
3.  The first 
part of that document contains quite a full exposition of the market failures that may lead to 
sub-optimal levels of R&D and innovation and may therefore justify state aid. The framework 
insists on the importance of targeting the aid accurately so that it has a real incentive effect. 
To demonstrate such an effect, the Member State may produce evidence that the aid has led to 
an increase in the size or scope of a project or that it has induced the aid beneficiary to 
increase its total spending on R&D. The framework also points out that aid may distort 
competition by creating or strengthening a position of market power, maintaining an 
inefficient market structure or, most importantly, reducing the incentives for non-aided firms 
to carry out research and to innovate. A number of criteria are listed for assessing the extent 
of the distortions caused by the aid, such as the closeness to the market of the aided project, 
the degree of product differentiation and the costs associated with exit from the innovation 
process
 4. The framework contains only a vague description of how negative and positive 
                                                 
2 European Commission (2005a). 
3 European Commission (2006b). 
4 According to the framework, competitors are more likely to maintain or increase their investments in R&D 
when exit barriers are high, e.g. when competitors have committed significant past investments to a particular 
R&D and innovation trajectory.   4
effects are to be weighed against each other in order to determine whether an aid is in "the 
common interest" but it does establish the important principle that the Commission equates 
the common interest with economic efficiency, i.e. total welfare
5. 
The aim of our paper is to contribute to the further development of the "refined economic 
approach" envisaged in the SAAP. In so doing we are able to take advantage of important 
recent additions to the previously rather sparse economic literature on state aid. The following 
articles and reports are of particular interest: 
•  A major study carried out for the European Commission by CRA International on 
"Methods to analyse the impact of state aid on competition" (CRA 2006), hereafter 
referred to as the CRA report, 
•  An important contribution to the debate on the State Aid Action Plan from the U.K.'s 
Office of Fair Trading, one of the few national competition authorities to take an interest 
in the impact of state aid and state aid control on competition (OFT 2005), 
•  An overview of the legal and economic framework with proposals for a new 
"architecture" of state aid control by Friederiszick et al. (2005). 
•  A paper by Garcia and Neven (2005), which constructs a benchmark model for analysing 
the cross-country effects of state aid. 
Of these documents, CRA (2006) is a particularly thorough and wide-ranging review of the 
economic underpinnings of Community state aid control. The structure of our paper is 
therefore inspired by the themes and recommendations of the CRA report
6. Independently of 
the value of its specific recommendations, the report has the virtue of questioning the 
traditional assumptions that are embedded in the state aid rules. A radical reform of state aid 
policy, as envisaged in the SAAP, needs to re-examine these assumptions, jettison those that 
do not correspond to reality and make better use of the knowledge gained from theoretical and 
empirical economics. 
The CRA report makes the following principal recommendations: 
Recommendation a 
State aids should be judged against a social welfare standard, of which the effect on rivals is 
only one element; the analysis should also encompass effects on domestic and foreign 
consumers and non-market effects (externalities), as well as taking account of the marginal 
cost of public funds. 
Recommendation b 
The sequence of analysis should be: 
1.  Is there a significant market failure (or other obstacle to achievement of a Community 
objective)? 
2.  Is the aid appropriate? 
3.  Definition of the relevant market. 
4.  Analysis of the counterfactual scenario. 
5.  Decision and remedies. 
                                                 
5 However, since the text specifies that this principle applies "for the purposes of this framework", it may not 
necessarily be applied to state aid which is subject to other rules. 
6 For a very readable presentation of the main themes of the CRA report, see Heidhues and Nitsche (2006).   5
An alternative sequence, giving more weight to the principle of subsidiarity, would start with 
the definition of the relevant market. If the market is national or smaller, the aid would be 
considered compatible with the common market. The aid would also be considered 
compatible if, in a second step, it were found that the recipient would be unlikely to behave in 
an anti-competitive way (predatory pricing or foreclosure) and the other Member States are 
not significant net exporters of the relevant product. 
Recommendation c 
Member States should be required to show that there is a significant market failure and that 
the aid is an appropriate means of remedying it. 
This recommendation could be understood as an analogy to merger control, where the EC 
Merger Regulation places the burden on merging firms to show that efficiency gains are 
merger-specific, likely to be realised and sufficient to counteract any adverse effect on 
consumers that might otherwise result from the merger. In the present context of state aid 
control, Member States could be required to provide relevant information in order to 
demonstrate that the claimed efficiencies (i.e. remedy of a market failure) are aid-specific, 
likely to be realised and to outweigh any adverse effects on consumers and producers. 
Recommendation d 
The criteria used to screen state aids should be tailored to the market failure. In particular, it 
should not be assumed that low amounts of aid or low aid intensities
7 are ipso facto 
innocuous. 
Recommendation e 
The analysis of an aid’s impact on rivals and consumers should focus on the longer-run 
effects on market structure and incentives. 
Our discussion of the questions raised by the CRA report starts with the fundamental 
questions of the objectives of state aid control, considered in the light of the principle of 
subsidiarity, and the welfare standard to be applied. Without clarity about the objectives and 
about the way different costs and benefits are to be traded off against each other, 
methodological questions cannot be answered satisfactorily. To gain some insight into the 
rationale of state aid control, we take account of the legal and institutional background. 
Turning then to the actual process of evaluating state aid cases, we consider the role that 
market failure plays in the analysis, screening criteria that can be used to concentrate the 
Commission's resources on the most problematic cases and, finally, factors that may be taken 
into account in the detailed assessment of the competition effects of individual state aids. 
2.   The objectives of state aid control and the welfare standard  
State aid control has evolved through time to encompass different objectives. We examine 
several of them in turn, distinguishing in particular between the explicit (i.e. legal/Treaty 
based) objectives of state aid control and other accessory candidate objectives often suggested 
or called for, mainly for efficiency reasons. We also address the issue of subsidiarity, i.e. the 
division of tasks between the Commission and Member States. To conclude this part, we 
discuss the welfare standard which would best capture the objectives of state aid control. 
                                                 
7 Aid intensity is the term used by the European Commission to denote the ratio (expressed as a percentage) 
between the amount of aid and the eligible costs.   6
As a preliminary remark it should be pointed out that unless Member States respect their 
notification and reporting obligations to the Commission, the control of State aid will not be 
effective, whatever its objectives. In this context, one may reflect on the desirable features of 
an effective disciplining mechanism that would encourage Member States to better comply 
with their obligations. This could for example result from strengthening the Commission's 
investigative powers in state aid cases, or from setting up credible sanctioning tools at the 
Community level.  
To avoid distortions of competition and trade 
The initial motivation of State aid control was to avoid trade disputes between Member States 
and collectively wasteful subsidy competition. Economic theory shows that subsidies, in the 
presence of market distortions, can restore efficiency. However, it also shows how subsidies 
often introduce distortions and therefore welfare losses into the domestic and the global 
economy. Certain countries may for example try to protect their domestic production through 
subsidies and deter foreign competition from entering the market in order to shift profits from 
abroad to the home industry.  The resulting distortions of trade can lead to retaliatory 
measures and counter-subsidisation which may be a source of further inefficiency (Lehner 
and Meiklejohn, 1991). A supranational body is clearly needed to ensure that competition and 
trade are not distorted and in the institutional structure of the EU the Commission is the 
obvious candidate. 
The trade policy literature concerning subsidies focuses on export or production subsidies. 
However, in the EU export aid is forbidden, while production subsidies are only permissible 
in a narrow range of circumstances. On the other hand, with increasing mobility of capital, the 
practice of granting subsidies aimed at attracting or retaining footloose investments has 
become widespread both in the EU and in the rest of the world
8. 
One could imagine a world in which every country or region is free to bid for investments. 
This would result in an overall increase in welfare if: 
1.  public authorities always bid only as much as the investment is worth to them
9, 
implying (a) that they have perfect information, (b) that they are not subject to budget 
constraints and (c) that decisions are not influenced by capture or corruption; 
2.  firms choose the location on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of all the options, 
taking account of the incentives offered by public authorities; 
3.  raising public funds entails no deadweight loss; 
4.  we are indifferent as to the distribution of income/wealth. 
In practice, the first condition is unlikely to be met because of asymmetric information and 
because most public authorities are subject to tight budget constraints. The second condition 
is rarely met, because firms have imperfect information about all the investment options open 
to them. On the other hand, the third condition can be approximated by reducing the public 
authority's bid by the average deadweight loss associated with taxation. Finally, although the 
fourth condition is a matter of political choice, while some economists may profess complete 
indifference to distributional issues, no politician could do so and survive.  
In the light of these four conditions, we can identify four main reasons why EU control of 
state aid might be justified as a means of limiting "competition for capital" between Member 
States. The first is based on equity considerations. More prosperous countries and regions 
                                                 
8 For a good discussion of competition to attract investment, see Besley and Seabright (1999). 
9 More strictly, what it is worth to have the investment in the region rather than elsewhere.   7
clearly have a better chance in a bidding war to attract investment than their poorer 
counterparts, because the budget constraints are not so tight in the former
10. Second, state aid 
control could be welfare-enhancing if it limits the probability of government failure, due to 
asymmetric information, capture or corruption. Third, even in the unlikely situation where all 
of the first three of the above conditions are fulfilled, such competition between Member 
States could enable the firms concerned to capture for themselves – via the taxpayer - the 
value of all the externalities which they confer on the regions where they establish 
themselves. It may therefore be in the interest of Member States to agree to restrictions on 
their ability to bid for investments in order to limit such redistributive consequences. Finally, 
Community control of state aid enables Member States to credibly commit to refuse demands 
for "retention incentives". The practice of paying "retention incentives", which is widespread 
amongst states and municipalities in the USA, involves the payment of substantial sums of 
taxpayers' money not to promote new investment but simply to retain a firm in its present 
location. If the local authority is persuaded that the firm in question could profitably move 
elsewhere, it could be rational for the authority at any given point in time to pay an amount 
equal to the value of the local externalities for the rest of the establishment's life. If such a 
game is repeated a number of times, the taxpayers could ultimately pay many times the true 
value of the benefits derived by the local community from the firm's presence
11.  
The effects linked to globalisation – and in particular the increasing competition between EU 
firms and firms based in other jurisdictions – may however call into question the way State 
aid control has been carried out until now. The European control of state aid is unique in the 
world as other regional economic groupings and federal states, including the USA, lack 
mechanisms for controlling subsidies. One of the key questions (frequently raised by Member 
States) is whether the EU state aid control regime puts EU firms at a disadvantage compared 
to firms in other jurisdictions, even if the use of subsidies is to some extent already restricted 
by WTO rules.  
It may be worth reflecting on whether and how to extend State aid control at the international 
level or whether any adjustments need to be made to EU policy to take account of the global 
context. However, revising the existing rules in such a way as to give Member States effective 
powers to take counter-measures against trade-distorting actions of non-members may be 
difficult to do without opening up too many new possibilities for distorting intra-EU 
competition. Moreover, it could be argued that the state aid rules are already flexible enough 
to cope with global markets and thus enable EU firms to compete with the best firms globally, 
while still being strict enough to ensure that EU firms remain efficient. For example, the EU 
State aid framework in the field of R&D includes a “matching clause” which is specially 
designed to allow higher R&D aid in cases where it is shown that firms outside the EU have 
benefited from more aid than would normally be allowed under EU rules. Finally, 
countervailing subsidies would in addition be in breach of the WTO code, which only allows 
two kinds of countervailing measures if a country refuses to withdraw a subsidy, namely 
countervailing duties and voluntary undertakings by exporters to revise their prices. On the 
other hand, it may be worth bearing in mind that countervailing subsidies may do less harm to 
domestic welfare than other trade policy measures, because they directly enhance consumer 
                                                 
10 The EU attempts to address this problem, in part by providing extra funds for disadvantaged regions and in 
part by restricting the amounts of aid that can be granted in different types of regions in order to give the poorer 
regions a better chance of succeeding in their efforts to attract more investment. 
11 It might be argued that, if distributional consequences are disregarded, the payment of retention incentives is 
economically efficient since it compensates the firm for the opportunity cost of remaining in its present location. 
However, each time the game is repeated the problem of asymmetric information is posed anew.    8
welfare, whereas the direct effect of measures which restrict trade is detrimental to consumers 
(Messerlin, 1999).   
Government failures – less and better targeted state aid 
Reducing the overall level of state aid is a long-standing EU policy objective which is 
incorporated, along with better targeted aids, in the Lisbon Agenda
12 and later became a 
leitmotif of the State Aid Action Plan. Reducing the volume of state aid is not only a question 
of budget discipline (although no part of government expenditure should be exempt from 
discipline); it also reflects a wide-spread view that a significant proportion of state aid is 
inefficient and distortive
13. Hence, state aid control is seen as being concerned not only with 
minimising distortions of competition but also with limiting government failures. 
The Commission can play a role in helping Member States to limit inefficient and distortive 
aid, for example by requiring Member States to carry out ex ante impact assessments and ex 
post evaluations. In this way, progress can be made towards the objective of better targeted 
aid. However, the competition rules do not impose limits on the budgetary envelopes 
allocated to state aid. If the rules were to be redesigned to take account of the objective of 
reducing the total volume of aid, a methodology would be needed for determining what the 
acceptable aggregate level of aid may be and all expenditure would have to be monitored 
closely, including aid granted under the de minimis rules and under block exemptions. 
Government failures may arise when governments are lobbied. Lobbying can be effective 
when the government is handicapped by asymmetric information. Furthermore, governments 
may fear the electoral consequences of giving way to pressure from an interest group less than 
the consequences of resisting it, since the benefits of a state aid are readily perceived in the 
firm, industry or region concerned while the costs are diffused amongst the taxpaying 
population. It has also been plausibly suggested that governments may regard wasteful 
spending as a worthwhile price to pay to signal their apparent commitment and 'hard work', 
thus improving their chances of re-election (Dewatripont and Seabright, 2005). Control at the 
EU level does not necessarily solve these problems, since the Commission may also be 
influenced by stakeholders. As State aid control deals with Member States' behaviour, there is 
in particular a risk of intervention by national governments in the Commission's decision-
making. However, the fact that the Commission is subject to much more diverse pressures 
than national governments should, in principle, help to ensure that its decisions are more 
balanced. 
One may however question whether intervention by the Commission in cases of misspending 
of public funds is compatible with the principle of subsidiarity. After all, it is in the Member 
States’ own interest to provide effective aids at the lowest cost, even if short-term electoral 
considerations sometimes obscure this fact. Decentralised mechanisms at the level of Member 
States, such as the involvement of the national audit authority may be a better way of limiting 
“government failure” of this sort. 
In addition, the evaluation of the positive impact of aids as well as shadow costs of aid such as 
the cost of taxation and redistribution is not easy for the Commission, which may lack 
relevant information. As explained in the section on market failure below, it may be difficult 
to determine whether there is a significant market failure which can be well remedied by State 
aids for example. The Member States are clearly in a better position to carry out evaluations 
                                                 
12 The Lisbon Agenda is a package of measures that were introduced in 2000 with the aim of making Europe the 
most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. 
13 Ilzkovitz et al (2001).   9
of the benefits and costs of their own aid measures because they have better access to relevant 
information.  
Finally, the EU has alternative means of exerting pressure on the Member States to use state 
aid more effectively, since economic policies pursued by Member States are coordinated at 
the EU level through mechanisms such as the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines.  
The Welfare standard 
From an economic perspective the total welfare standard is often favoured over other ways of 
measuring welfare because it avoids the potential for inefficient outcomes that is inherent 
when considering exclusively either the consumer or the producer surplus.
14 The CRA report 
recommends applying a social welfare standard where a trade-off between positive and 
negative effects of state aid is implied. In addition to distortion of competition, the negative 
effects would also take into account the direct cost of the subsidy and the deadweight loss 
arising from the distortive effect of taxation. The social welfare standard differs from total 
welfare in that equity objectives are also taken into account, i.e. benefits or costs to certain 
disadvantaged groups or regions are given a special weight in the analysis. This is coherent 
with the objectives of EU policy, including better targeted aids and increased allocative 
efficiency.  
However, other parts of EU competition policy explicitly equate “distortion of competition” 
with harm to consumer welfare. According to Martin and Strasse (2005), state aid control 
does not sufficiently take into account the European consumer interest. Friederiszick et al. 
argue that there should be a special emphasis on consumer welfare to counterbalance the fact 
that governments are more likely to support the interests of domestic producers than 
consumers and because non-domestic rivals are likely to be well represented in the 
Commission's decision-making process.  
Past State aid decisions paid much less attention to effects on consumers than to effects on 
rivals. The emphasis on the effect on rivals may be justified by the fact that if efficient rivals 
are weakened, effective competition may be hindered with the result that allocative efficiency 
is reduced in the long run. In other words, there may in the long run be little difference in a 
dynamic framework between the consumer welfare standard and a standard based on the 
impact on competitors' profit. 
The need to make a trade-off between costs and benefits is explicitly mentioned in a number 
of Commission policy documents and Court judgements. In principle, therefore, CRA's 
recommendation to adopt a social welfare standard is not particularly radical. However, up to 
now the assessment of costs and benefits has been made in an opaque way and there is a need 
to clarify the weights that the Commission attaches to different effects of state aid. Depending 
on the objective of State aid, the welfare standard may vary.  
In conclusion, it seems to us that a number of questions concerning the objectives of state aid 
control remain to be clarified. Perhaps the most important of these are:  
•  What are the precise objectives of State aid control and what is the relative priority of 
each of them? 
•  What costs and benefits should be encompassed in the trade-off?  
•  Should the marginal cost of public funds be explicitly taken into account? 
                                                 
14 The total welfare standard takes into account the effect of a change on the sum of producer and consumer 
surpluses (that is the costs and benefits to both consumers and producers) whereas the consumer and producer 
welfare standards are concerned solely with the effects on consumers and producers respectively.   10
The answers to these questions will to a large extent determine the choices to be made 
concerning many of the issues discussed below. 
3.  Market failure  
The economic concept of market failure describes those situations where the market fails to 
provide the optimal level of a good or service because the assumptions which allow markets 
to provide optimal outcomes do not hold. For example, where the assumption of complete 
information is not met, banks may be unwilling to provide credit to companies about which 
they do not have sufficient information to calculate the risk of default, even though these 
loans may in reality be low risk. 
The economic definition of market failure is only concerned with efficiency, and does not 
cover all of the Community objectives that are set out in Article 87 of the Treaty such as the 
development of poorer regions of the EU or the execution of important projects of European 
interest, although the concept could be applied to the latter. In this note we concentrate on true 
market failures in the economic sense, but we recognise that by using a social welfare 
definition that takes account of the community objectives outlined in Article 87 it would be 
possible to widen the definition of market failure to include these objectives. 
Typical examples of situations where market failures often occur include those activities 
which have negative environmental impacts, because property rights associated with damage 
to the environment often do not exist or are not enforceable, and the activities of SMEs, which 
suffer from various market failures including those caused by capital market imperfections. 
Another example is research and development, where the spillovers created by R&D efforts 
lead to benefits (positive externalities) which cannot be captured by the firm carrying out the 
research.  
However, within these broad categories there is significant heterogeneity in the seriousness of 
the market failure. For example in the case of R&D activities, fundamental research often 
leads to significant positive spillovers and it is therefore more difficult for firms to extract all 
the benefits. Research relating to products which are close to being marketed is less likely to 
lead to spillovers and so market failure is less of a concern. 
The CRA report identifies the existence of a significant market failure as a key condition for 
determining whether a particular state aid has the potential to enhance welfare.
15 The report 
also makes clear that market failure is a necessary but not sufficient condition for government 
subsidies to be welfare enhancing. This means that even where a market failure exists, state 
intervention will not always be beneficial and in many cases will do more harm than good. 
However where no significant market failure exists, state aid can only have a negative effect 
overall. 
Determining whether a significant market failure exists 
Once it has been established that aid can only be welfare enhancing in cases where there are 
significant market failures, the problem for state bodies giving out aids is to decide when a 
particular activity is characterised by market failure. Economic theory provides useful insights 
but general empirical indicators of market failures are not easy to find. One option is to 
examine whether other countries give aids to a particular activity. If a significant number of 
countries give aid to an activity it may indicate that market failures exist which are best 
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solved by state aid. However this method is by no means perfect. The giving of aid in other 
countries may be due to factors other than market failures. For example, the existence of aid 
for a particular activity in multiple countries could be due to a subsidy race between these 
countries. 
Putting the concept of market failure at the heart of the decision on whether an aid is 
compatible with the common market leads to important policy conclusions. In cases where no 
significant market failure can be identified, the CRA report argues that the aid should be 
declared incompatible without the need for further analysis. This is because in the absence of 
market failure there can be no positive welfare effect from the aid and so the overall effect on 
welfare must be negative once the costs of raising the funds to finance the aid are taken into 
account. The Office of Fair Trading report
16 takes a less strict approach and argues that if a 
market failure cannot be identified, aid should not be declared incompatible but be subjected 
to a more in-depth analysis of its anti-competitive effects. 
Our interpretation of Article 87 and the case law is that, as long as there are some potential 
effects on trade and distortion of competition, however slight, the Commission cannot 
authorise an aid unless it is justified by some Community objective. However, one could 
imagine circumventing this problem by applying only rudimentary tests of the purpose and 
appropriateness of the aid whenever the trade effect is small. In other words, in the first stage 
of the analysis the Commission would attach very little weight to the domestic effects of the 
aid, which would be seriously considered only in those cases when the aid seems likely to 
have important negative consequences for other Member States. This approach could be 
justified by the principle of subsidiarity but is not compatible with the view that the 
Commission has a duty to use all the instruments at its disposal to promote the efficiency of 
the European economy. From a practical point of view, it would require the identification of 
reasonably reliable indicators of the effects of aid on trade and competition, as discussed in 
more detail in Section 4. 
In cases where a significant market failure is identified, OFT (2005) argues that as long as the 
aid is not too selective in terms of the eligible recipients, it can be approved up to certain 
intensity ceilings without further analysis. The CRA report takes a more extreme position by 
arguing that if state aid addresses a market failure in a targeted way, the distortive effect on 
effective competition is zero, independent of the dominance of the recipient. This seems to be 
a step too far because even aid which perfectly remedies the intended market failure can lead 
to inefficient firms remaining in markets and/or efficient ones being forced out. For example, 
R&D aid is given to small firms to offset capital market imperfections which may prevent 
them from securing the necessary research funding. The aid may well reduce the externality 
caused by capital market imperfections but it can also be argued that it helps to maintain firms 
which may be below the minimum scale required to operate efficiently in the market. 
The burden of proof 
The CRA report recommends that Member States should be required to show evidence that 
there is a significant market failure and that the aid is an appropriate means of remedying it. 
From a legal point of view, since the starting point of Article 87 is a presumption of 
incompatibility, it is logical that the burden of proof should lie on the Member State which 
proposes to grant an aid. In practice, however, the Commission’s guidelines and regulations 
have created a presumption that significant market failures affect certain types of activity in 
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all Member States and can be efficiently remedied by state aids which satisfy a few minimal 
conditions.  
The current Community rules do not usually diagnose precisely the market failures concerned 
or require that the aid should be targeted to a specific market failure
17. Thus, for example, the 
SME block exemption regulation assumes that subsidising investment is an appropriate 
response to multiple possible market failures, which are not clearly distinguished (e.g. 
positive externalities, risk aversion, asymmetric information in capital markets). The strict 
implementation of the CRA recommendation would therefore represent a radical departure 
from past practice. 
It is generally accepted that it is extremely difficult to measure the importance of a market 
failure. It is doubtful, therefore, whether this part of the CRA recommendations could ever be 
implemented rigorously. However, Member States could be required to provide much more 
information to demonstrate the appropriateness of the state aid measures that they propose to 
remedy the market failures, such as ex ante impact assessments of their proposals and ex post 
evaluations of similar schemes, including schemes implemented in other countries. For many 
Member States, particularly those that have not yet developed a culture of evaluation, such 
requirements would initially impose a very heavy burden. However, the burden could be 
gradually reduced by pooling information on evaluations carried out by the Member States. 
Effectiveness of state aid as a remedy for market failure 
Even where a significant market failure has been identified and state aid is a candidate 
solution, whether and how it can represent an optimal solution will depend on a number of 
factors: 
Availability of alternative remedies 
Even in cases where the benefits of giving aid outweigh the costs, state aid is not necessarily 
the optimal way to reduce or eliminate the market failure; other ways of achieving the same 
result may be available that are more cost-effective and therefore lead to a greater increase in 
welfare. Market failures can be reduced using policy tools such as taxation or regulation. For 
example, a government may wish to reduce levels of air pollution. In order to do this it could 
give state aid to polluters for the purchase of filters to clean their emissions. Alternatively it 
could simply create a tax on emissions which would encourage producers to buy their own 
filters or find other means of reducing emissions. If a similar result in terms of reducing 
environmental externalities can be achieved through taxation then it is likely to be a superior 
solution in welfare terms as it does not require an increase in distortive general taxation which 
would be required in order to raise the necessary funds for the aid.  
As a general rule, in the case of overprovision of a good or service (negative externalities) the 
obvious solution is to impose a tax or regulation. However in reality in some cases it is 
necessary for practical reasons to either substitute a tax or regulation with a subsidy or to give 
subsidies in order to soften the impact of a tax or regulation. One reason for adopting this 
strategy may be the political difficulty of full implementation of the principle whereby the 
agent causing the externality must internalise the externality (for example, in the case of 
environmental externalities, the polluter-pays principle). Another reason may be to level the 
playing field with competitors from other countries who are subject to less strict 
environmental regulation. When a country adopts stricter environmental standards than its 
trade partners, the resulting cost increase may lead to a reduction in domestic output of the 
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affected products and an increase in the output of the other countries. The increase in foreign 
output would in turn result in a growth in those countries' emissions of pollutants. Such an 
increase in foreign emissions could greatly diminish or even nullify the environmental 
benefits from applying the stricter regulations to the domestic industry. 
In most cases the Commission will not have enough information to be able to decide by itself 
whether viable alternatives to state aid are available. Putting the burden on Member States to 
show that no alternative remedies are available allows it to make use of local knowledge of 
alternatives. Clearly Member States that are keen for the aid to be allowed will have an 
incentive to present potential alternatives in a negative light but it is for the Commission to 
assess the Member State’s submission critically. The process would also force the Member 
State to at least consider on a systematic basis whether alternatives to state aid are available.  
Amount/intensity of aid 
Current Commission guidelines on state aid in some cases put explicit limits on the intensity 
of aid that can be given in particular circumstances. The CRA report argues strongly that such 
limits are misguided and that the intensity of aid necessary to correct a market failure depends 
on the seriousness of the market failure. In particular the report argues that the intuition “more 
aid means more distortion” can lead to wrong conclusions. The report argues that, on the 
contrary, if state aid effectively addresses market failures, a larger amount may not distort but 
benefit effective competition. While this argument is clearly correct, it needs to be balanced 
against the Commission’s desire to define where possible clear and simple rules for 
identifying cases where aid is likely to harm competition.  
OFT (2005) acknowledges that the intensity of aid is not a perfect measure, since even where 
intensity is high the investment being made may be small relative to the size of the market and 
so unlikely to affect competition. However, the OFT considers that using intensities as a 
criterion for further investigation allows the Commission to look in more detail at subsidies 
which, “give a high degree of assistance in changing the recipient’s behaviour”. This 
conclusion is based on the assumption that aid which does not lead to a significant change in 
behaviour is unlikely to harm competition. There are two problems with this assumption. 
Firstly, from an economic point of view if the aid does not change behaviour of the recipient 
then it cannot help to reduce the identified market failure. From a legal point of view, if the 
aid does not change the behaviour of the aided firms, it cannot contribute to the furthering of 
Community objectives as set out in Article 87(3) and so should be considered incompatible 
with the common market.
18 The issue of aid intensity is also discussed in part 4, in relation to 
whether it is appropriate to use intensity as an initial screening criterion. 
Aid instrument 
Our knowledge of the effectiveness of different aid instruments is limited. However, some 
instruments seem to be more appropriate than others for remedying specific market failures. 
As the CRA report points out, the literature shows that the optimal aid instrument depends on 
the policy objective. The form of the aid should also follow from the nature of the market 
failure.  
For example, where the market failure in question is that financial institutions do not have 
sufficient information about small firms' likelihood of defaulting on a loan,  the correct form 
of aid should be state support for venture capital, loan guarantees, subsidies towards banks’ 
                                                 
18 cf. the Commission's decision on the proposal of Austria to award aid to the Hoffmann-La Roche company for 
the development of the drug `Orlistat', designed for the treatment of pathological obesity (European Commission 
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costs of processing small loan applications and - possibly - interest rebates, rather than 
outright investment grants. The correct response targets the cause of the market failure rather 
than the symptoms. 
The Community rules concerning rescue aid provide an example of existing restrictions on the 
aid instruments that can be used; the rules state that loan guarantees of a limited duration are 
the only acceptable form aid for supporting firms in financial difficulties while they draw up 
restructuring plans. However, there is a lack of both theoretical and empirical work on the 
workings of different aid instruments. More knowledge of this subject must be accumulated, 
notably through evaluation studies of state aid schemes, before the "goodness of fit" between 
the aid instrument and the objective can be used more widely as a criterion in state aid 
analysis. 
Conditions of aid 
By conditions of aid, we mean rules which define to which firms the aid is granted and also 
on which activities the aid can be spent. Depending on the nature of the conditions, they may 
have direct impact on whether the aid will have a positive or negative impact on welfare. In 
general, the more closely the conditions target the aid on the market failure in question, the 
more likely it will be that the aid is effective in addressing that market failure.  
One problem with attaching conditions to how aid can be spent is that in some cases it may be 
impossible to identify whether firms have shifted away to other activities expenditure which 
previously would have been spent on the aided activity, thereby negating the beneficial effect 
of the aid. When combined with the extra administrative costs of monitoring that the 
conditions are being met, in some cases attaching conditions to the aid may be welfare 
reducing compared to simply giving the aid without linking it to eligible expenditure. This 
situation is likely to be limited to cases where a counterfactual (without aid) situation is hard 
to estimate and where monitoring of the conditions is difficult. 
Most awards of aid place conditions on which firms can benefit. Some kind of selectivity is 
almost always necessary as there are no market failures from which all firms suffer to the 
same degree. Selectivity allows aid to be targeted at firms which are most affected by the 
market failure that the aid is designed to address and in this sense selectivity is desirable as 
giving aid to firms which do not suffer from the particular market failure will most likely be 
welfare reducing.
19  
On the other hand, aid which is selective between companies in the same market is much 
more likely to lead to competition distortions. In reality, because no two companies are 
exactly the same, even aids which are not selective by design will have different effects on 
different companies and so will distort competition to some extent. The question is when do 
these distortions become so important that the aid should be declared incompatible? Clearly, 
selective aid which leads to the exit of unaided firms from a market should not be looked on 
favourably, but it is less clear whether aid should be banned if it allows the aided firm to 
increase its market share at the expense of unaided firms while not pushing them below the 
minimum efficient scale.
20 
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concession is an example of competition for the market, as opposed to competition in the market. In practice, it 
is often found that even if firms which bid unsuccessfully for a concession in one period retire from the market, 
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Use of impact assessment, evaluation, benchmarking 
The ex ante measurement of market failures and of the success particular state aids have in 
reducing market failures is extremely difficult. The CRA study proposes improving the 
system of monitoring and assessing the effect of state aids after they have been awarded. A 
good quality ex post evaluation of the effects of a state aid on welfare is a difficult exercise 
but over time the results of evaluations would feed back into the decision making process, 
allowing Member States to determine which aids give the best value for money and allowing 
the Commission to make better decisions on which aids should be permitted. 
Over time, a systematic ex post evaluation of aids would also allow Member States to build up 
an evidence base of those that were successful and those that were not. These data can then be 
used to provide additional evidence to the Commission when the compatibility of aid is being 
considered in future cases. It is probably unrealistic to expect Member States to evaluate all 
aid schemes. However, the "culture of evaluation" is slowly spreading in the EU and it does 
not seem unreasonable for the Commission to impose a requirement for ex post evaluation as 
a condition for approval of the largest schemes. It is important to safeguard against 
unconscious or intentional bias in such evaluations, notably by entrusting them to bodies 
which are not involved in the design or implementation of the schemes. 
4.   Screening criteria 
To make best use of its resources, minimise the administrative burden imposed on Member 
States and enterprises and ensure a minimum degree of predictability, the Commission makes 
use of a number of legal instruments: the de minimis regulation, block exemption regulations 
and Commission guidelines
21. A common feature of all these instruments is that they specify 
quantitative limits, in terms of absolute aid amounts or aid intensities, below which state aid is 
allowable if other conditions are met. The rules may also impose limits on the granting of 
state aid according to the characteristics of the aided firms, e.g. by limiting eligibility to 
SMEs, modulating aid intensities according to the size of the firm or excluding particular 
sectors. Furthermore, the rules may differ according to the size of the aided project (R&D, 
regional aid). If aid exceeds the limits laid down in the relevant regulations, guidelines or 
frameworks, it may be either forbidden or subject to individual notification and approval. 
In its current practice the European Commission applies two screens to filter out state aid 
cases that do not need an in-depth examination. The first is the de minimis rule, which, with a 
few exceptions, exempts from notification aid which does not exceed €200000
22  for any one 
firm over any three-year period. The test here is primarily quantitative, focussing on the 
amount of aid per firm. The second screen consists of the application of the other block 
exemption regulations. These regulations exempt aid measures that address specified policy 
objectives
23 and meet a mix of conditions, both qualitative and quantitative. The quantitative 
limits in these regulations always include maximum aid intensities and usually also include 
limits on the total eligible cost of the aided project or on the absolute amount of the aid.  
                                                 
21 We use the term "guidelines" to cover also the documents known as frameworks, which differ from guidelines 
in that they impose certain obligations on Member States. 
22 €100000 in the road transport sector. 
23 At the time of writing block exemption regulations covered aid to small and medium-sized enterprises, aid for 
employment and training and regional aid. The Commission was consulting Member States on a draft general 
block exemption regulation which would consolidate and simplify these regulations and include additional 
provisions relating to aid for environmental purposes, R&D and the promotion of risk capital.    16
Member States are expected to undertake a self-assessment and to notify to the Commission 
all those aids that do not satisfy the conditions laid down in the block exemption regulations. 
Aid measures which fail the tests of the appropriate block exemption regulations or which 
address policy objectives outside the scope of these regulations are examined by the 
Commission. The first step in this examination is to determine whether Commission 
guidelines are applicable. Since guidelines have been adopted to cover all the major market 
failures and policy objectives that are targeted by state aid, aid measures that fall outside the 
scope of these guidelines are subject to very searching scrutiny. Such scrutiny focuses in 
particular on determining whether the aid addresses a significant market failure or other 
objective of Community policy and whether it is an appropriate and proportionate means of 
meeting the objective. Aid measures that fall within the scope of guidelines are usually 
subject to a less rigorous analysis, which in the past was often limited to a rather mechanical 
application of a checklist of criteria
24. These criteria included notably maximum aid 
intensities that could not be exceeded in any circumstances.   
The application of these instruments makes it possible to single out cases which, in the 
Commission's view, present a high risk of significant distortions of competition. However, the 
quantitative ceilings and thresholds applied by the Commission reflect a subjective ranking of 
the perceived gravity or importance of the problems addressed and are not derived from any 
empirical knowledge of the levels of aid required to overcome specific market failures. 
Consequently, as the CRA Report argues, they may also be a poor guide to the extent of the 
market distortions that could be caused by an aid.  
Aid is especially likely to cause harm to competition in the following circumstances: 
•  The aid is granted in the absence of a clearly established market failure. In this case 
competition can be harmed either because the subsidised output displaces output of non-
aided firms or because the aid has no effect on the activity which is its ostensible object 
but can be diverted by the beneficiary to strengthen its position in some other market.  
•  The aid exceeds the amount necessary to correct the market failure. The beneficiary may 
use the windfall gain to support some other activity with potentially distortive effects. 
•  The conditions under which the aid is granted are either not defined with sufficient 
precision to ensure that the market failure is corrected or not strictly enforced. As a result, 
the beneficiary may be able to divert some or all of the aid from its intended objective. 
The primary question raised by the CRA recommendation on screening is how thresholds and 
ceilings can be fixed in a less arbitrary way that more closely reflects the market failures 
addressed by the state aids. As discussed in section 3, the empirical data needed to relate the 
screening criteria to specific market failures are not yet available although they could be 
assembled with the cooperation of the Member States. In this section and section 5, therefore, 
we consider only very broad general indications of the extent of the market failure (or other 
obstacle to achieving Community objectives) and give more attention to assessing the 
usefulness of different indicators of the size of potential effects on trade and competition. 
We shall examine the following parameters: 
•  Objective of the aid 
•  Method of allocating the aid  
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•  Size of the effect on trade 
•  Aid intensity 
•  Size of the project 
•  Absolute amount of aid 
•  Size of the recipient firm 
•  Sector of activity 
The number of quantitative screening criteria must be kept to a minimum, preferably only 
one, because all the potential quantitative indicators have important disadvantages. Each of 
the indicators can potentially result in errors of both Type I (misidentifying some innocuous 
aids as harmful) and Type II (failing to identify some harmful aids). Using cumulative criteria 
(BOTH…AND) would result in clearing too many aids that could create competition 
problems and should be examined in more detail, while applying two or more criteria as 
alternatives (EITHER…OR) could catch too many harmless aids.  
Market-specific characteristics, which can give a much more accurate picture of the likely 
impact of an aid, cannot easily be taken into account in general rules and regulations but must 
be considered on a case-by-case basis. They are discussed in the last part of this paper. 
Outside of services of general economic interest
25 and some environmental aids, operating 
aids
26 are relatively unusual in the EU. Aid for investment in fixed assets and R&D 
predominates. Our discussion in this section therefore concentrates on these categories of aid, 
while bearing in mind that the effects can often be comparable to the effects of operating aid. 
We focus in this part on the use of indicators to establish thresholds above which aids would 
be subject to individual notification and approval. Although it has always been the 
Commission's practice to impose strict upper limits on aid intensity (so-called aid ceilings), 
we consider that the economic arguments in favour of this practice are weak. As CRA (2006) 
points out, very grave market failures may require very high levels of aid, whereas the more 
serious the market failure the less likely it is that the aid will significantly distort competition. 
Furthermore, since, as we argue below, all simple indicators of competition effects have 
substantial weaknesses, it seems undesirable to impose rigid limitations in terms of such 
variables. 
Objective of the aid 
As mentioned above, the practice of the Commission is to examine in detail all aids, other 
than those that qualify as de minimis, whose purpose differs from the normally accepted 
objectives of state aid, e.g. promoting the development of disadvantaged regions or remedying 
market failures affecting R&D or the financing of SMEs. This is an essential screen since, as 
we have argued above, no aid can be welfare-enhancing if it does not constitute an 
appropriate response to a genuine market failure. When a Member State proposes to grant aid 
for a novel purpose, therefore, the existence of a market failure has to be verified and the 
appropriateness of state aid as an instrument to remedy the alleged market failure has to be 
very carefully evaluated. 
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26 The term "operating aid" is used by the European Commission to denote any aid which reduces the recurring 
costs of an enterprise. The notion of recurring costs covers not only variable costs but also recurrent elements of 
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Method of allocating aid 
The effectiveness of aid is enhanced if it is allocated by means of an open and transparent 
mechanism (cf CRA, 2006, section 4.4.3), particularly if the selection criteria are well 
designed to identify the firms that can most efficiently contribute to achieving the aid's 
objectives. Eligibility for aid should therefore be as open as possible. Indeed, if aid appears to 
have been allocated arbitrarily the suspicion could arise that the aid is a response to lobbying 
or that it is motivated by strategic trade considerations, rather than by a need to remedy a 
market failure. 
Open tendering procedures are common practice for services of general economic interest. 
Under the “Altmark” rules, aid granted following an open call for tenders often falls outside 
Article 87(1) and is not subject to control because it is regarded as simply a compensation for 
a service performed on behalf of the state. However, even aid allocated by fair and open 
competition is not necessarily harmless to competition, given that some firms will not receive 
aid and may subsequently exit the market. The exit of less efficient firms can lead to lower 
welfare if the resulting reduction in competitive pressure leads to higher prices and lower 
output. 
While bidding procedures are usually the best way of allocating responsibilities for providing 
public services, they are not appropriate for most other situations in which aid is granted. An 
alternative approach for ensuring openness and transparency is to institute a system of widely 
publicised calls for expressions of interest, coupled with transparent selection procedures 
based on clearly defined criteria. Indeed, the Community guidelines on agricultural aid 
stipulate that aid for closing production, processing and marketing capacity may only be 
granted if the Member State has put in place such a system
27. However, this rule does not 
apply to aid for other purposes. If both tendering and calls for expressions of interest are too 
costly in relation to the size of the aid scheme, “first come, first served” may be the only 
feasible non-discriminatory rule. 
Whatever the method used, selection criteria and restrictions on eligibility that do not seem to 
be justified by the objective of the aid should be scrutinised closely.  Furthermore, since the 
award of aid always involves the exercise of some discretion, ex post checks on the 
distribution of aid would be useful to detect biases that are not evident in the formal rules. 
Size of the effect on trade 
As explained in the introduction, CRA (2006) proposes two options for the sequence of 
analysis of state aid cases. The second option begins with the effect on trade. This is in 
accordance with Article 87(1), which gives the Commission jurisdiction only when trade is 
affected and competition is, or could be, distorted. However, according to past practice and 
jurisprudence, as explained in Section 3, the notions of effect on trade and distortion of 
competition are to be interpreted so widely that very few cases escape from the Commission’s 
oversight for this reason
28. CRA’s second option therefore goes further by proposing that the 
magnitude of the effect on trade could be the first screening criterion and that all aids that do 
not appreciably affect trade could be cleared without having to satisfy other conditions. 
Aid intensity 
                                                 
27 European Commission (2006c). 
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and Altmark judgements. The criterion of selectivity (“favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods”), which we do not discuss here, is in practice a much more important limitation on the scope of 
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Aid intensity is defined as aid divided by the eligible expenditure. The most obvious argument 
in support of aid intensity as a screening criterion is that when aid exceeds the level needed to 
change the recipient’s behaviour in the desired way, the excess can be used by the beneficiary 
for some other purpose, which may be detrimental to competition
29. Other things being equal, 
the higher the aid intensity, the greater the probability that the project is over-subsidised. 
Another argument in favour of the intensity criterion is that a minimum contribution by the 
beneficiary is needed to ensure that the latter has an incentive to carry out the subsidised 
activity efficiently
30. 
As an indicator of the effect on rivals, aid intensity has the drawback that it relates only to 
eligible expenditure. If the eligible expenditure is only a small part of the total costs of the 
activity concerned, even a high aid intensity will not have a big impact on competition
31. In an 
attempt to deal with this problem, the Commission's rules on regional aid for a time applied a 
capital/labour (K/L) factor to correct for capital intensity. This was not a good solution 
because high K/L firms often have high variable costs other than labour and because there are 
wide variations in unit labour costs between industries and countries. 
As an indicator of over-subsidisation, aid intensity has to be considered in relation to market 
failure. The aid intensity ceilings and thresholds applied hitherto to whole classes of cases 
have been arbitrary and there is a need to find reliable empirical evidence to provide a more 
objective basis for them. However, even in an in-depth analysis of an individual case, it can 
be very difficult to estimate the aid intensity needed to overcome a market failure. 
In this respect, CRA (2006) argues (section 4.4.1) that if the aid intensity is too low to change 
the recipient’s behaviour, the aid is clearly welfare-reducing, taking account of the marginal 
cost of public funds, since it does not correct a market failure. Indeed, low aid intensities may 
indicate that there is no significant market failure. Following this argument, guidelines should 
not encourage or require Member States to fix very low aid ceilings. On the other hand, 
serious market failures may require high aid intensities, while any detrimental effect on 
competition may often be small, since in the “no aid” situation the pre-existing or potential 
competition would be weak or non-existent. 
If the aid-giving authority is a reasonably good judge of the level of incentives needed to 
induce firms to undertake the desired investments, the aid intensity should be negatively 
correlated with the private rate of return. A government that aims to maximise social welfare 
must determine an aid intensity i such that (s – r)/m  ≥  i  ≥  h – r, where s is the social rate of 
return on the investment, r is the expected private rate of return, m  > 1 is the marginal cost of 
public funds and h is the hurdle rate of return required by the beneficiary. A government 
which wishes to minimise transfers from the taxpayers to business will try to establish a value 
of i as close to h - r as possible. Consequently, low aid intensity may indicate either that the 
difference between social and private returns is small or that the expected private return is 
close to the hurdle rate. Since in imperfectly competitive markets, a higher private return is 
likely to imply a bigger effect on rivals, this constitutes an additional argument for not 
considering low intensity as an extenuating factor. Nevertheless, because governments often 
cannot judge how much aid is necessary to create the desired incentive effect, it would be 
unrealistic to infer the corollary that a high aid intensity necessarily indicates that the private 
return on the investment is low and that the aid is therefore innocuous. 
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rather than sunk costs. 
31 Note that OFT (2005) does not refer to aid intensity but to the size of the subsidy “relative to the costs of the 
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A final argument against the use of aid intensity as a screening criterion is that high-intensity 
aid will have little effect on competition if the subsidised project or activity is small. 
However, as we argue below, even if project size may be a more meaningful simple indicator 
of competition effects and in spite of the drawbacks of using more than one indicator, aid 
intensity limits might be used in conjunction with aid amounts in order to discourage 
recipients or Member States from understating the size of projects. 
Size of the project 
Project size thresholds, beyond which aid proposals have to be individually notified and 
approved, are currently laid down in the Community rules on regional aid
32 and aid for R&D 
and innovation
33. The rules on aid for other purposes disregard project size as an indicator of 
the aid's potential to distort competition. 
It is obvious that, other things being equal, the bigger the aided project, the greater the 
potential effect on competition. Strictly speaking, however, the impact of the aid is only 
identical to that of the project if the aid is an essential precondition for the decision to invest. 
In many cases, however, the aid may influence the scale of the project or its location but not 
the initial decision to invest. Moreover, in some cases the aid will be a pure windfall gain for 
the recipient if the subsidised activity is profitable without any aid.  
However, in Community guidelines and regulations and when assessing aid schemes it is not 
possible to distinguish between the various possible impacts that the aid may have in 
individual cases. Therefore, if the size of the aided project is used as an indicator of the effect 
on competition, a worst-case scenario will have to be assumed. This scenario is the one which 
equates the effect of the aid with that of the entire project, i.e. it assumes that the beneficiary 
would not invest at all in the absence of the aid. However, it seems probable that cases which 
satisfy this assumption are atypical. It is more likely that the aid influences the scale of the 
project or its location – or, indeed, that the aid is simply a windfall gain. In such cases the 
amount of aid is a better guide to the effects on competition than the total size of the project. 
If, in spite of these considerations, the size of the project is used as an indicator, to determine 
whether the size of a project is significant we ideally need to compare it with the size of the 
sector or (preferably) the market concerned but this would require a case-by-case 
examination. Project size thresholds in guidelines and regulations therefore have to be fixed at 
levels that are not so high that they are irrelevant to a large number of smaller sectors and 
markets or so low that they greatly increase the number of individual cases to be examined
34. 
Rules are also required to prevent national authorities from circumventing the individual 
notification requirement by artificially splitting projects. The regional aid guidelines therefore 
stipulate that all investment undertaken over a period of three years in economically 
indivisible assets is to be considered part of one and the same project. A similar rule could be 
applied to R&D, although three years might not be long enough to cover major R&D projects. 
If the project size is the only screening criterion and aid intensity is therefore not taken into 
account, Member States wishing to avoid close scrutiny of large projects would be 
encouraged to understate the size of the project, e.g. by defining the eligible costs so that they 
are significantly smaller than the total costs. To overcome this problem, either the amount of 
aid or the aid intensity may have to be taken into account as an alternative criterion even if 
                                                 
32 European Commission (2006c and d). 
33 European Commission (2006b). 
34 The project size threshold is €50 million in the regional aid guidelines but €25 million in the R&D framework. 
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our main interest is in the size of the project. Where the apparent size of the project is small 
but the aid intensity is high, the competition effects of the aid should be assessed in the light 
of any related investments undertaken or planned by the beneficiary.   
Absolute amount of aid 
CRA (2006) argues (in section 4.4.1) that allowing small amounts of aid encourages wasteful 
use of public funds, that the cumulative effect of a large number of small aids can be 
important and that the transaction costs for “project-based” schemes are likely to be so high 
that small aids will not produce positive net welfare effects. On the other hand, it can be 
argued, firstly, that the incentive for governments to make excessive use of small aids is weak 
because small aids are unlikely to receive wide publicity and, secondly, that a small amount of 
aid cannot induce a large change in output and therefore cannot create a big distortion of 
competition
35. There is a lack of empirical data to indicate whether governments commonly 
misuse small aids (e.g. for electoral advantage) and on the distribution of small aids. Since 
small amounts of aid may have a significant incentive effect on small firms, a low absolute 
amount of aid should not be regarded as constituting in itself evidence that there is no 
significant market failure. 
For the reasons given above in the discussion of project size, the absolute amount of aid may 
be an appropriate criterion for deciding when a project should be subject to individual 
approval by the Commission. As a very rough general rule, the larger the amount of aid the 
greater the change in the recipient’s behaviour and hence the greater the potential effect on 
competition. As in the case of project size, an aid amount threshold will inevitably be 
somewhat arbitrary but, on the basis of past cases, it could be fixed at a level that is relevant 
to the important sectors of the economy. 
However, a drawback of the aid amount as an indicator of effects on competition is that it 
does not distinguish between large projects aided at a low intensity and smaller projects aided 
at a higher intensity. Furthermore, a rule would still be needed to prevent Member States from 
artificially dividing projects. 
There may also be a case for controlling the cumulation of aid by a single company, even if 
different eligible costs are concerned, since there may be a close economic link between the 
aided investments, as when a vertically integrated firm expands its capacities both upstream 
and downstream. Even if the aided investments are apparently unrelated, repeated aids to the 
same firm may indicate that the firm enjoys the special favour of the national authorities, 
thereby discouraging potential entrants. It may also be desirable to control cumulation of aid 
from more than one country, because a project may involve investment at more than one 
location. 
Size of the firm 
The size of the recipient firm can be used as an indicator both of the potential impact of aid on 
rivals and of the existence of market failures (especially capital market failures). For the first 
purpose, the most useful measure of size is market share but, as this requires definition of the 
relevant market, it is not a practicable screening criterion. Size in terms of turnover and/or 
employment therefore has to be used as a proxy for both purposes. 
CRA (2006, section 3.6.4) points out that larger firms are less likely to be financially 
constrained than smaller firms and hence more likely to use aid for non-targeted purposes, 
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such as predation and foreclosure. The CRA report also notes that large firms are more likely 
than smaller firms to provide internal financing to overcome capital market failures and are 
better able to protect information flowing from their R&D (section 7.1.3). Consequently, the 
size of the recipient firm could be a relevant criterion for the assessment of the necessity and 
proportionality of aid. 
On the other hand, on the basis of the Bergstrom-Varian result
36, CRA argues that the size of 
the recipient firm is not a good indicator of the effect of aid on competition. According to the 
Bergstrom-Varian result, the equilibrium output and market price in a Cournot setting depend 
only on the sum of the marginal costs, not on their distribution across firms. This suggests that 
a given amount of aid will hurt rivals’ profits most (and benefit consumers most in the short 
run) if it is granted to the smallest firm, provided that the aid reduces marginal costs. This is 
probably of little practical relevance to EU state aid control, in particular because much of the 
aid is given for investment or R&D. The effect of such aid on marginal cost is indirect and the 
effect on rivals is usually limited by capacity constraints on the beneficiary. Furthermore, the 
Cournot assumptions, notably product homogeneity, are not often satisfied in real cases that 
come before the Commission. 
Sector of activity  
In rules relating to regional investment aid
37, the Commission traditionally imposed 
restrictions on aid to declining industries or industries where there is structural overcapacity 
(steel, shipbuilding, synthetic fibres, clothing and textiles). Overcapacity has been abandoned 
as a criterion in the regional aid guidelines because it is difficult to define it and to find 
adequate data. A recent proposal to introduce a general ban on regional aid to declining 
industries was abandoned because the historical output data do not cover all sectors. 
Investment aid is likely to harm competition in declining sectors if it results in an increase in 
the beneficiary firm’s capacity. In sectors where there is already excess capacity, investment 
aid can also distort competition if it lowers the firm’s variable costs without increasing its 
capacity, since the firm’s output is likely to increase at the expense of rivals.  
If the Commission attaches particular importance to cross-border effects on competitors, an 
important assessment criterion would be the extent to which the affected products or services 
enter into intra-Community trade. The now-abandoned LET (limited effect on trade) proposal, 
for example, envisaged that aid to sectors producing largely non-traded products and services 
would be subject to less stringent rules. However, this proposal encountered at least two 
difficulties. One was that, although services are most likely to be non-tradable, hard data on 
trade in services are scarce. The second problem was that the progress of market integration 
means that the category of non-tradables is shrinking over time. 
In spite of these problems, a list of sectors producing predominantly non-traded products 
could be a useful tool for reducing unnecessary administrative costs of state aid control, even 
if the list is partial and needs to be reviewed regularly. 
Conclusions on screening criteria 
Our analysis of screening criteria has dealt only briefly with the relatively unexplored field of 
indicators of market failure. However, the way in which Member States choose the 
beneficiaries of state aid may shed some light on this question, albeit obliquely. Indeed, the 
selection of aid beneficiaries deserves much more attention than it has hitherto received. Even 
in the more familiar territory of indicators of the trade and competition effects of state aid, we 
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find that all the candidate criteria, taken either singly or in combinations, have drawbacks 
which could lead to quite large numbers of false positives or false negatives. Amongst the 
quantitative criteria, we are inclined, on balance, to favour the absolute amount of aid. 
However, we have not addressed the important question of setting appropriate threshold 
values for these variables; this is a question that merits a significant research effort. The view 
of the OFT
38 is that such values can only be valid for individual affected markets. However, 
without more research, it would be unduly pessimistic to rule out the possibility of 
determining some typical values that would be appropriate, without too wide a margin of 
error, for most markets. 
5.  Analysis of individual cases: market- and firm-specific indicators of competition 
problems 
This section discusses indicators of market and firm characteristics that may be important in 
the assessment of the impact of state aid on competition. The identification of such indicators 
is conditional on the prior definition of a relevant market, provided it exists.
39 Before 
considering individual indicators in turn, it is thus necessary to briefly discuss the concept of 
market definition in a state aid context first. 
Relevant market definition in a state aid framework 
The definition of a relevant market is a standard tool used in merger control and antitrust to 
identify the firms that are present in a market and to measure their degree of market power. 
The market definition exercise as such defines boundaries of a market in product, geographic 
and time space, within which a hypothetical monopolist could impose a price above the 
competitive level.
40 While the techniques developed and applied in merger control and 
antitrust may serve as a useful starting point, the use of market definition has to be adapted to 
the objectives of state aid control. Indeed, whereas in the former cases the aim is to identify 
potential competition-distorting effects arising from (increased) market power (as a result of 
firms' harmful – unilateral or coordinated – behaviour, such as abuses of dominant positions 
or collusion), the aim in the case of state aid control is to identify competition-distorting 
effects arising from changes in firm-behaviour triggered by the reception of state aid.
41 Such 
distortions are more likely to be observed where the objectives of the state aid are not well-
defined and where the aid is ultimately inadequate either to remedy a market failure or to 
meet another Community objective. In contrast to antitrust, where the expected harm done to 
consumers may arise from practices which lead to excessive prices, output restrictions or 
product quality reductions, these channels can almost certainly be ruled out in the short run in 
the case of an aid. Depending on the eventual use of the aid by its beneficiary, such harmful 
effects can however occur over a longer time horizon. We now consider in turn two cases in 
which the identification of the relevant markets affected is particularly complex: multi-
product firms and vertically-related markets. 
Multi-product firms 
                                                 
38 OFT (2005), Annex C, paragraphs 1.11 and 1.12. 
39 While the latter condition may sound trivial, the objective of state aid may in certain cases precisely be to 
create a market in the first place, for instance by promoting the development of a new product 
40 Usually the so-called SSNIP (Small Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price) test is applied, which 
consists of widening the candidate market until the point is reached where a hypothetical monopolist in that 
market could profitably increase its price by 5-10% relative to the competitive price.  
41 For an extensive discussion of the use of market definition in state aid control, see Fingleton et al. (1999).   24
In cases where the aid beneficiary is a multi-product firm that is able to cross-subsidise its 
activities or engage in tying or bundling practices, one should ideally take into consideration 
all the different markets it is operating in, regardless of whether the aid is targeted to a 
specific sub-activity
42. In addition, the firm’s ability and incentives to enter other markets 
upon reception of the aid would have to be considered too. This would however require 
extensive information on firm strategy, which may be impossible to obtain in practice. A 
resulting complexity when approving state aid is that the identified markets may exhibit 
different characteristics (e.g. market concentration, maturity of the market, etc), and the 
recipient’s market position is likely to vary across them, e.g. it might have a large share in one 
market and at the same time a small share in another; it might not (yet) be present in a market 
at all. If the ultimate use of the aid granted to the firm cannot be directly traced or monitored 
and other markets need to be taken into consideration, this could imply: 
•  A risk of incompleteness, i.e. the assessment is partial and omits the (potentially) negative 
effect on markets that were not explicitly targeted by the aid. 
•  A risk of contradictory conclusions regarding the distortive potential of an aid (e.g. aid to 
a particular firm would be allowed on the basis of the characteristics of market A; aid to 
the same firm would be prohibited on the basis of characteristics of market B) and the 
resulting need for arbitration, depending on the weights and standards applied.  
Where the traceability of an aid cannot be guaranteed, other markets in which the firm is 
present (but which are not themselves targeted by the aid) should thus ideally be included in 
the assessment. While this does not necessarily need to become a default option, it is justified 
in cases where the existence and significance of a market failure is doubtful or where there is 
a reasonable suspicion that the aid awarded to address it is excessive and may be used by the 
firm in the pursuit of anti-competitive objectives. 
Vertically related markets 
If a subsidised firm has strong upstream or downstream linkages, these markets should be 
included in an assessment, as they are also likely to be affected by any aid-induced changes in 
the market of the recipient. If a subsidy leads to an increase in the output of the aid recipient 
(possibly at the expense of its competitors), two scenarios can be envisaged regarding the 
effects on upstream markets. In the first scenario, the aid beneficiary and its competitors use 
the same input without discriminating between upstream suppliers. The subsidy would then 
have a neutral or positive effect on all suppliers operating in the upstream market, who can 
compete for any additional demand
43. In the second scenario, the aided firm discriminates 
between the suppliers. This could be the case where the aided firm and its competitors source 
their inputs from suppliers who respectively operate in different countries, or whose products 
are imperfectly substitutable. In that case the subsidy would have a positive effect on the 
suppliers of the aid beneficiary (who, as a result of the aid, demands more inputs) and could 
have a negative effect on the suppliers of non-aided firms (who, as a result of the aid to their 
competitor, may reduce their demand for inputs). Such a scenario would be conceivable in 
situations where a beneficiary has an own personal incentive to engage in customer 
foreclosure. 
Analogously, one can infer the expected effect of a subsidy on downstream markets. If all 
firms in the downstream market have access to the cheaper or additional output of the aid 
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beneficiary, the subsidy will have a positive effect on the downstream market since it will 
reduce firms' production costs. On the other hand, if some firms in the downstream market are 
excluded from purchasing additional, cheaper inputs, either for technical reasons (use of 
different inputs) or because the beneficiary engages in input foreclosure, the subsidy could 
have a distortive effect in downstream markets.  
Vertical foreclosure scenarios are most likely to occur when aids are awarded to vertically-
integrated firms, which have the incentive to discriminate between their own inputs and those 
of rivals. State aids to vertically-integrated firms thus deserve a particularly careful control. 
Market characteristics indicators 
We now consider the extent to which market characteristics can help to predict the effect of 
an aid on the beneficiary's rivals. Among its principal recommendations, CRA (2006) 
suggests to analyse an aid’s impact on rivals and consumers by focusing on the long-run 
effects on market structure and incentives. Indeed, the short-run impact of an aid on 
consumers is highly unlikely to be negative, since the aid provides the beneficiary with 
additional resources. Market characteristics indicators can reveal the likely incentive structure 
of firms and make it possible to draw up scenarios concerning the evolution of the market. 
One can then assess how firms' incentives and the conjectured long-term evolution of the 
market would be affected as a result of the aid. These indicators could, in individual cases, 
substantially enrich the underlying analytical basis for allowing or prohibiting an aid. They 
may also prove useful when comparing the aid-scenario(s) to different counterfactual 
scenarios (e.g. non-intervention, non-aid-intervention). Furthermore, a better knowledge of 
the functioning of markets will also be useful to reassess, and as a result to validate or refute, 
any conclusions drawn in the initial steps of the screening, such as the identification of market 
failures. 
Aids which reduce the marginal cost of firms at the same time modify their supply 
conditions
44. As a result, firms increase their production level (relative to the counterfactual 
scenario) and – under the realistic assumption that markets are not perfectly competitive, and 
the firms face a downward-sloping demand curve – also lower the price charged. On the 
condition that the aid recipient reduces its price, rivals will face a reduced demand
45. The 
resulting harm suffered by rivals increases with the cross-price elasticity of demand. Harm to 
rivals is interpreted here as an erosion of their profits, forcing them, in the extreme case, out 
of the market. In the longer-run this harm to rivals could be passed on to consumers in the 
form of any adverse effects resulting from reduced competition. Focussing on the long-run 
effect on rivals and the long-run effect on consumers is to some extent equivalent. Indeed, as 
noted by Friederiszick et al. (2005) "the effect on rivals […] can be a proxy for the negative 
impact on consumers in a dynamic sense. The greater the negative effect on rivals, the more 
likely it is that consumers will be negatively affected in the longer run”. 
The market characteristics indicators discussed below should not be seen as stand-alone 
indicators, but should be considered in conjunction with the other information about the 
market failure and aid characteristics discussed in parts 3 and 4. It should also be pointed out 
that the list of indicators presented here is not necessarily exhaustive. 
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Market concentration 
The significance of competition distortion resulting from a subsidy is likely to increase, other 
things being equal, with the degree of market concentration. Intuitively, in a non-concentrated 
market, each firm has a low market share and presumably little influence on the market price. 
Conversely, in a highly concentrated market where firms have higher market shares, they are 
also more likely to influence the market price by their decisions and thereby directly affect 
any existing rivals. 
A possible proxy for market concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI)
46. 
Analogous to its use in merger control it could be used to measure market concentration prior 
to the aid and to estimate the change in market concentration as a result of the aid (the 'delta'), 
given certain assumptions. As the aid may cause a reshuffle in market shares, the HHI could 
possibly fall, if a beneficiary firm gained market shares at the expense of a larger one. For ex 
ante authorization of state aid, a high pre-aid HHI and an expected negative delta could be 
deemed pro-competitive and, provided that the aid is given to an efficient firm, tend to a 
favourable assessment.




The lower the degree of product differentiation, the stronger the effect of a subsidy on rivals’ 
profits will be, other things being equal. Intuitively, product differentiation implies that firms 
have some market power, as their products are less substitutable. The lower the 
substitutability, the more limited will be the impact of price changes on competitors (i.e. there 
is limited rivalry between the firms). 
In practice it is difficult to measure the degree of product differentiation, once it is established 
that the products under consideration belong to the same market. An easily verifiable 
indicator could be the nationality of firms (as suggested by Garcia and Neven (2005)). Indeed, 
if there is a national bias similar products may be considered as imperfect substitutes merely 
because of their origin. In that case the effect of a subsidy to a domestic firm on its foreign 
rivals would be attenuated. Other indicators used as proxies for product differentiation include 
the ratio of advertising to sales (to capture the degree of brand loyalty), and expenditure on 
R&D. They can provide a good indication of the effort undertaken by firms to differentiate 
their products from those of rivals. High advertising or R&D expenditures would thus point to 
high product differentiation and non-price competition.  
Barriers to entry 
The significance of competition distortions resulting from a subsidy is likely to increase when 
there are entry barriers to the market. Barriers to entry can be defined as “anything that allows 
incumbent firms to earn supranormal profits without threat of entry” (Tirole (1988)). The 
nature and magnitude of factors preventing such a threat indicate the degree of contestability 
of a market, that is the extent to which a potential competitor, willing to enter the market, 
would be deterred from doing so. The threat of entry can be absent or be severely reduced as a 
result of two types of barriers: institutional barriers to entry (any restrictions resulting from 
government interference such as licences, regulations, norms, etc.) and economic barriers to 
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entry, such as the level of sunk (i.e. non-recoverable) costs. Analysing barriers to entry in 
state aid control is important to the extent that the state aid could lead a firm to engage in 
predation and the eviction of rivals from the market, in order to gain market power. If high 
market barriers preclude the threat of entry, the aid beneficiary would then ultimately have an 
incentive to abuse its market power. The long-term consequences would be negative for 
forced-out rivals and consumers alike. 
A symptom of the presence and the deterrent effect of entry barriers to a market is the firm-
turnover in that market. This is defined as the total number of firms entering and leaving the 
market in a given year, relative to all firms active in a market. A low value (relative to some 
benchmark, which could be another product market or the same product market in another 
geographic area) would suggest that there are existing entry barriers to a market, and that they 
are effectively difficult to overcome (without, however, pointing to any specific barrier in 
particular). 
A number of proxies exist to measure the importance of market entry barriers, which include:  
•  Advertising expenditure (endogenous sunk cost): a high level of advertising expenditure 
relative to sales in a market may indicate that the demand for a particular product is highly 
conditional on the advertising made for it. New firms would thus have to spend substantial 
amounts upfront, which – if available to them at all – would have to be recovered 
subsequently on the market, adding to all the risks already faced by entrants. A similar 
argument holds for R&D expenditure. 
•  Fixed costs relative to the market (and exogenous sunk costs): The argument for high 
fixed and exogenous sunk costs constituting barriers to entry is similar to the endogenous 
sunk cost example above. The difference, however, is that they are barriers of a technical 
nature. Besides the risks linked to the recovery of these costs through sales, they may also 
give an indication of the time necessary to enter a market. 
•  Regulatory barriers: regulatory barriers comprise all administrative burdens that are 
imposed upon firms entering a market. They range from the time necessary to set up a 
new firm, to licences (i.e. authorisations), awarded by public or professional bodies, which 
are necessary to carry out a specific activity. 
Barriers to exit 
Subsidies are less likely to harm rivals if market exit costs are high. Despite making losses in 
the short run, firms would be expected to remain in a market as long as the price they receive 
for their product exceeds the average variable cost of producing it. The gap between average 
total and average variable costs – and hence the likelihood of the price falling in between the 
two – increases with fixed costs of production. In industries that are characterised by high 
fixed costs, the predatory pricing strategy of an aid recipient, aiming at its rivals’ eviction, 
would be more likely to fail and the aid recipient would therefore be less likely to engage in it 
in the first place.  
Entry and expansion deterrence effects 
A firm’s decision to enter or expand its activities in a market is determined by the profits it 
expects to earn in that market. Expected profitability depends on structural factors (such as 
factor costs, taxes, regulatory burdens and demand characteristics) and on the nature of 
competition in the market. When assessing the impact of state aids, a fundamental point to 
consider is the extent to which the aid itself alters these expectations about profitability and   28
ultimately influences entry decisions (i.e. at what point does state aid itself become an 
entry/expansion barrier). A subsidy could affect expectations through different channels:  
•  An investment aid to a firm, inducing or upholding an activity by cutting a firm’s 
perceived non-recoverable (start-up or adjustment) costs, could credibly commit it to 
future production. This increased certainty about future production capacity could 
negatively affect the entry or expansion decision of a non-aided firm.  
•  An aid that reduces the firm’s effective marginal costs would exert downward pressure on 
prices charged in the market and negatively affect the expected profitability of a non-aided 
potential rival.  
•  An aid may also better equip an incumbent to accommodate the effects of entry in the 
market and in the worst case allow it to engage in predatory behaviour.  
•  A subsidy to a firm may also be a signal of a government’s willingness to support 
incumbents or domestic firms. If perceived as such, subsidies could have a dissuasive 
effect on potential entrants, in particular from abroad. The effect would be particularly 
strong if subsidies were repeatedly given to the same firm or firms. 
Nascent, growing and declining markets 
If the aid creates an entirely new market, the distortion is limited to any foreclosure of 
potential entrants. In such cases, the first step in the investigation should be to determine 
whether other companies could plausibly enter the market in the foreseeable future. This may 
not be easy, since it may require good information on the know-how and IPR available to 
other companies, their R&D programmes, their access to customers in the new market etc. In 
the second step, the ability to foreclose has to be examined. In some cases it may be found 
that, far from deterring entry, the aided project has a demonstration effect that encourages 
other firms to enter the market. Aid to a firm in an established but growing market will not 
have this demonstration effect but is less likely to have a catastrophic effect on rivals (i.e. the 
exit of one or more of them) than aid given to a firm in a declining market. However, while 
firms may not necessarily see their current level of sales being affected by an aid to rivals, 
they may nonetheless be hindered from seizing new opportunities, and thus from growing in 
the future. 
Mature markets 
In mature markets, harm to non-aided rivals is likely to occur much more directly and rapidly 
than in a growing market. Indeed, in such markets – where demand is stable and demand 
growth consequently absent – any (aid-induced) expansion of sales by one firm would 
inevitably occur at the expense of another. Such reshufflings of market shares are particularly 
likely to spill over to vertically-related markets through the channels described above. 
Recently opened markets 
Firms which operate in markets that are being deregulated or opened up to competition may 
be particularly ill-suited for receiving aids. Frequently, these markets are already mature and 
are characterised from the outset by very few market participants (a good illustration are 
markets supplied by network industries, such as electricity and gas). Having been regulated, 
they have hardly ever experienced effective competition, which takes some time to develop, 
since market entry is usually sluggish at first. In such markets entry costs may already be 
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incumbents, reduce the entry incentives of potential entrants and ultimately hold back the 
development of effective competition. 
Physical size of the project 
Where investment aid is concerned, the effect on rivals is a function of the additional capacity 
created by the project. The regional aid guidelines contain a rule forbidding aid to projects 
which create additional capacity equivalent to more than 5% of EEA apparent consumption, 
unless the market is growing faster than the economy as a whole. However, capacity is 
difficult to measure in service sectors other than transport. 
Conclusions on the analysis of individual cases 
This section has reviewed indicators of market and firm characteristics that might have to be 
taken into account in state aid control. Even though none of these indicators can by itself 
enable firm conclusions to be drawn, in appropriate combinations they can shed light on the 
probable effect of aid on competition. 
Conclusions 
Governments regularly provide state aids to firms, which may be justified on efficiency or 
equity grounds. However, such aids may also inflict harm on non-aided firms, which may 
ultimately be passed on to consumers as well, especially if inefficient firms are supported at 
the expense of more efficient ones. The main objective of state aid control is thus to contain 
these adverse effects, without prejudicing potential benefits. Besides eliminating anti-
competitive state aids, a good state aid control system may also guide Member States towards 
more efficient design and implementation of state aid schemes. Indeed, the need to comply 
with a particular assessment sequence, starting off with the examination of the need for aid in 
a particular circumstance and its contribution to addressing this need, incites aid-awarding 
institutions to reflect thoroughly on their reasons for intervening, thus limiting the scope for 
wasteful and harmful aids. 
The SAAP has outlined a sequence, which has since been applied in various Commission 
guidelines, beginning with an analysis of the positive effects of aid (i.e. its contribution 
towards addressing a particular need). The second stage of the procedure focuses on negative 
effects resulting from the aid, while in the final stage both effects need to be traded off against 
each other. Other than this conceptual approach, many open questions remain as regards the 
practical implementation of state aid control.  
This paper has aimed at raising and discussing some of these open questions, which need to 
be more rigorously addressed in subsequent analyses. It has notably considered the issue of 
whether state aid control should be aimed solely at minimising distortions of cross-border 
competition or whether it should also promote economic efficiency in a wider sense. In the 
context of the justifications for subsidies the paper has stressed the central role of market 
failures and discussed their identification as well as different conditions under which aids 
could be successful in addressing them. Finally, we have suggested a series of indicators that 
can contribute to identifying conditions (e.g. aid-, firm- or market characteristics) which 
would give rise to or exacerbate negative effects as a consequence of aids. Such indicators 
should be taken into account either as screening criteria or in the context of individual aid 
assessments. However, work remains to be done as regards the quantification (notably the 
determination of thresholds) of some of these indicators. 
   30
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